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Abstract
This paper connects coalgebra with a long discussion in the foundations of game theory on the
modeling of type spaces. We argue that type spaces are coalgebras, that universal type spaces
are ﬁnal coalgebras, and that the modal logics already proposed in the economic theory literature
are closely related to those in recent work in coalgebraic modal logic. In the other direction, the
categories of interest in this work are usually measurable spaces or compact (Hausdorﬀ) topological
spaces. A coalgebraic version of the construction of the universal type space due to Heifetz and
Samet [5] is generalized for some functors in those categories. Since the concrete categories of
interest have not been explored so deeply in the coalgebra literature, we have some new results.
We show that every functor on the category of measurable spaces built from constant functors,
products, coproducts, and the probability measure space functor has a ﬁnal coalgebra. Moreover,
we construct this ﬁnal coalgebra from the relevant version of coalgebraic modal logic. Speciﬁcally,
we consider the set of theories of points in all coalgebras and endow this set with a measurable and
coalgebra structure.
Keywords: Coalgebra, ﬁnal coalgebra, Harsanyi type space, measurable space, probabilities,
beliefs.
1 Introduction: Type Spaces
This paper is a ﬁrst exploration of the application of ideas and results from
coalgebra to the foundational area of game theory concerned with type spaces.
Type spaces are mathematical structures used in modeling settings where
agents are described by their types, and these types give us “beliefs about the
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world”, “beliefs about each other’s beliefs about the world”, “beliefs about
each other’s beliefs about each other’s beliefs about the world”, etc. That is,
the formal concept of a type space is intended to capture in one structure an
unfolding inﬁnite hierarchy related to interactive belief.
The 1994 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences was awarded to John C.
Harsanyi, John F. Nash Jr., and Reinhard Selten “for their pioneering anal-
ysis of equilibria in the theory of non-cooperative games.” In addition to his
work on equilibria, Harsanyi will also be remembered for his introduction of
type spaces in a three-part paper published in 1967 and 1968 [4]. He showed
how to convert a game with incomplete information into one with complete
yet imperfect information. This matter is not relevant to our paper, but three
related points are noteworthy. First, Harsanyi’s notion of types goes further
than what we described above: an agent’s type gives us their beliefs about the
types of the other agents. Second, despite this circularity, the informal concept
of a type (as a “pool” from which all players can be picked) is widespread in
areas of non-cooperative game theory and economic theory. And ﬁnally, the
formalization of type spaces was, and to some extent still is, an open area.
That is, Harsanyi did not really formalize type spaces in his original paper;
this was left to later researchers. Getting back to our very rough informal de-
scription above, what exactly are “beliefs”? And how can a structure contain
types which give rise to beliefs about other types? What is the relation of
this to the inﬁnite hierarchy of beliefs about beliefs about · · · beliefs about
the world? Can we characterize the space of all possible types? So there is a
collection of papers on this matter, starting with Bo¨ge and Eisele’s paper [2]
from 1979. Again, we are not much concerned with these conceptual matters
in this paper. Most of the important papers for our study are technical con-
tributions dealing with the matter of universal type spaces. A universal type
space is intended to capture all possible types, so it is an answer to our third
question above.
There are some clear conceptual clues that coalgebra could be connected
to type spaces. The ﬁrst is that the notion of “belief” in the game theory liter-
ature is typically a probabilistic one. If we replace “belief” with “knowledge”
above, then we have a very-well-studied notion, the formalization of knowl-
edge by possible worlds semantics. The mathematical structures for possible
worlds semantics are sets W of worlds with two functions, one giving for each
world w ∈ W some set of “atomic propositions” true at w, and the other
giving for each w some set of worlds which are said to be “possible from w”.
These structures are essentially the coalgebras in the category Set of sets of
the functor F (W ) = A×P(W ), where A is the power set of the set of atomic
propositions and P is the power set functor on sets. Perhaps the primary
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contribution of coalgebra to this area to date is to show that modal logic, the
natural logical language for the structures, generalizes to coalgebraic versions
of modal logic. We’ll return to this point shortly.
The second clue has to do with the role of the universal type space in
this ﬁeld. Types are taken to be elements of the universal type space. In the
universal type space all possible types are uniquely represented, and the idea
is that two types with exactly the same beliefs about the underlying world of
“nature” plus the types of the other players are taken to be undistinguishable.
This is the same ideology as we ﬁnd concerning ﬁnal coalgebras, in which (as
is well known) points with the same behavior are identiﬁed.
Returning to type spaces, we recall that the usual modeling of belief in
game theory is via probability. So we would expect that type spaces should
be probabilistic versions of Kripke models. One should replace the functor P
with something like ∆, where
∆(W ) = {µ |µ is a probability measure on W}. (1)
Indeed, this is the case: most proposals in the literature do end up studying
certain mappings from a space X to some variation of the functor ∆ applied
to X. This is our third clue of the connection. But note that (1) leaves a
lot lacking: if W is just a set, how do we know that it has any probability
measures? Does it matter which σ-algebra we use? And if W is an object in
some other category, say measurable spaces or compact metric spaces, then
what structure do we put on ∆(W )?
We intend this paper to be a contribution to this area by connecting it
with coalgebra. Here are the main conceptual claims of the paper, as well as
the main results:
 The original notion of a Harsanyi type space may be taken to be a coal-
gebra of a functor F on MeasI , where Meas is the category of measurable
spaces and measurable maps, and I is a discrete category (of agents). But
this reformulation is not obvious, because the original notion had an ex-
tra condition that the agents “know their own type.” We discuss this in
Section 2.
 Universal type spaces are ﬁnal coalgebras.
 The constructions of universal type spaces in the literature are related
to constructions found in coalgebra. However, there are diﬀerences due
primarily to the fact that the work is going on in categories like Meas rather
that Set. Putting things diﬀerently, the universal type space constructions
can be generalized, and this is of interest in coalgebra.
 There are versions of coalgebraic modal logic for relevant functors, and
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one can prove the existence of ﬁnal coalgebras by considering the satisﬁed
theories in these logics. This construction parallels the construction of a
ﬁnal coalgebra on Set for F (W ) = A × P(W ) (or rather A × Pfin(W ),
using the ﬁnite power set functor) using the set of descriptions of all modal
theories of all possible worlds. We work a formulation of coalgebraic modal
logic based on the one due to Jacobs [7], following work of Kurz [9] and
Ro¨ßiger [11,12,13]. But we do diﬀer from these papers in that our ﬁnal
coalgebras are not connected to logical theories, but to the theories realized
in coalgebras. In the economic literature, this construction is due to Heifetz
and Samet [5].
 We formulate a notion of “measure polynomial functor” on Meas. We prove
a new result in Section 3: every such polynomial has a ﬁnal coalgebra with
carrier consisting of sets of sentences in a particular language. The method
also works for polynomial functors on Set, as we show in Section 5.2.
1.1 Background notions
A measurable space is a pair M = (M,Σ), where M is a set and Σ is a σ-
algebra of subsets of M . The sets in Σ are called measurable sets or events.
Usually Σ contains all singletons {x}; we shall almost always assume a weaker
condition that for each x ∈ M , {x} is the intersection of the measurable
subsets of M containing x. A collection B of subsets of M generates a σ-
algebra Σ if Σ is the smallest σ-algebra including B. A measure on M is a
σ-additive function µ : Σ → [0,∞]. The measure µ is a probability measure if
µ(M) = 1.
A morphism of measurable spaces f : (M,Σ) → (N,Σ′) is a function f :
M → N such that for each A ∈ Σ′, f−1(A) ∈ Σ. This gives a category Meas.
Meas has products and coproducts; indeed it has much more structure. There
is an endofunctor ∆ : Meas → Meas deﬁned by: ∆(M) is the set of probability
measures on M with the σ-algebra generated by {βp(E) : p ∈ [0, 1], E ∈ Σ},
where
βp(E) = {µ ∈ ∆(M) |µ(E) ≥ p}.
Here is how ∆ acts on morphisms. If f : M → N is measurable, then for
µ ∈ ∆(M) and A ∈ Σ′, (∆f)(µ)(A) = µ(f−1(A)). That is, (∆f)(µ) = µ◦f−1.
We also note some additional structure. First, there is a natural transfor-
mation δ : Id → ∆ deﬁned by δM(m)(E) = 1 if m ∈ E and 0 if m /∈ E.
We also write δm instead of δM(m); this is the Dirac measure supported
at m. Second, there is a natural transformation γ : ∆∆ → ∆ given by
γM(µ)(E) =
∫
ν∈∆(M) ν(E) dµ.
Lemma 1.1 (Giry [3]) (∆, δ, γ) is a monad.
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Lemma 1.2 For each p ∈ [0, 1], βp may be regarded as a ‘predicate lifting’.
That is βp takes measurable subsets of each space M to measurable subsets
of ∆(M), and it is natural in the sense that if f : M → N , then for all
measurable E ⊆ Y , βp(f−1(E)) = (∆f)−1(βp(E)).
Lemma 1.3 Suppose that the collection B of sets generates Σ. Then the
σ-algebra on ∆(M) is the generated by the sets of the form {βp(E) |E ∈
B and p ∈ [0, 1]}.
We shall also need one result from measure theory on the extension of
probability measures from collections of sets to the σ-algebras they generate.
Lemma 1.4 below follows from Dynkin’s π − λ Theorem. For more details,
see, for example Billingsley [1], page 36.
Lemma 1.4 Suppose that µ1 and µ2 are probability measures on σ(A), where
A is a family of sets which is closed under intersections and σ(A) is the σ-
algebra generated by A. If µ1 and µ2 agree on A, then they agree on σ(A).
We also need at some point to look more closely at products in Meas.
Given two measurable spaces, A and B, their product is the cartesian product
of the sets A and B, endowed with the σ-algebra generated by the “rectangles”
obtained as cartesian product of a measurable subset of A times a measurable
subset of B. With this σ-algebra, both projections are measurable. For a
subset E ⊆ A×B, the sections of E are the sets: Ea = {b : 〈a, b〉 ∈ E}, Eb =
{a : 〈a, b〉 ∈ E}. Each section of a measurable subset of the product is
measurable.
If µ is a probability measure on A and ν a probability measure on B, we can
deﬁne the probability measure µ× ν on A×B by (µ× ν)(E) = ∫ µ(Eb)dν =∫
ν(Ea)dµ.
Going in the other direction, a probability measure µ on A × B induces
via the projections, a measure on each of the factor spaces. These measures
are called marginals, and denoted by marAµ = (∆πA)µ = µ ◦ π−1A ; marBµ =
(∆πB)µ = µ ◦ π−1B .
Lemma 1.5 Let µ be a probability measure on a product measurable space
A×B. If marBµ = δb0 for some b0 ∈ B then µ = marAµ× δb0.
Proof. We only need to prove it for rectangles G×F , where G is a measurable
subset of A and F is a measurable subset of B.
We want to prove that µ(G × F ) = (marAµ)(G) × δb0(F ). We have two
cases: if b0 /∈ F , this reduces to proving that µ(G × F ) = 0, and if b0 ∈ F ,
then we want to show that µ(G×F ) = marAµ(G) = µ(π−1A (G)) = µ(G×B).
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Notice ﬁrst that for µ(G× B) = µ(π−1A (G)) = marAµ(G) = marAµ(G)×
δb0(B). Also µ(A× F ) = marBµ(F ) = δb0(F ) = (marAµ)(A)× δb0(F ).
Now we can prove that if b0 /∈ F , then µ(G× F ) ≤ µ(A× F ) = 0, and if
b0 ∈ F , then µ(G × F ) = µ(G × {b0}) + µ(G × (F \ {b0}) ≤ µ(G × {b0}) +
µ(A× (F \ {b0})) = µ(G× {b0}). On the other hand, µ(G× B) is also equal
to µ(G× {b0}) + 0. 
2 Formulation of Type Spaces as Coalgebras
The ﬁrst constructions of Harsanyi type spaces were based on a hierarchy of
beliefs. In this hierarchical approach, as seen for example in [10], types are
constructed by detailing the players’ beliefs about nature, about the other
players’ beliefs about nature, etc. Since each type gives a probability measure
on the set of all types, there is a function from types to probability measures
on states of nature and types. As we noted before, this is almost a coalgebra,
except that there are some extra conditions imposed on these functions.
At this point, we need to formulate the category MeasI . Fix a ﬁnite set
I of players. We assume that 0 /∈ I and we then deﬁne I0 = I ∪ {0}. This
“0” stands for “nature”, and so I0 includes nature as one of the players (but
one who won’t have beliefs about the other players). We consider I and I0 as
discrete categories.
The objects of MeasI are families X = (Xi)i∈I of measurable spaces, and
the morphisms are also families of measurable maps. Fix a measurable space
M to represent the “states of nature”, and write X0 for M . Each player should
have beliefs about nature and about the beliefs of the other player. This leads
to the following deﬁnition.
Let C : MeasI → Meas be the functor given by
CX =
∏
i∈I0
Xi
At ﬁrst glance, it might look like what we want is to consider for each xi ∈ Xi,
a probability measure on CX. However, this is not what we want because
it misses an important intuition concerning type spaces. This is that players
should know their own types. In other words, each player i should only have
beliefs about the (joint distribution on) other players’ beliefs; i’s own beliefs
should not even enter in. Thus we deﬁne functors Ui : Meas
I → Meas given
by
Ui(X) = Π{Xj | j ∈ I0, j = i}.
Ui acts the obvious way on morphisms. Note that Ui depends on the space
X0 of states of nature, even though our notation does not mention this.
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Now CX = UiX ×Xi up to isomorphisms. The fact we mentioned above,
about player i knowing her own type is modeled in [5] by adding the condition
that the corresponding measure on CX has marginal δxi on Xi. Here is where
Lemma 1.5 plays a role allowing us to recast type spaces as coalgebras: it is
essentially the same to consider measures on UiX and measures on CX for
which the marginal on Xi is a Dirac measure on a known point.
Finally our main innovation and the one that lets us model type spaces as
coalgebras is to work in MeasI , rather than working with the product of the
diﬀerent spaces considered.
Let F : MeasI → MeasI be deﬁned by
F(X) = (∆Ui(X))i∈I
As before ∆ is the probability measure space functor, and once again, our
notation elides the underlying space X0 of states of nature.
This way, instead of having a family of functions in Meas, each one of them
with a condition on one of its marginals, any morphism in MeasI works as a
coalgebra structure. The particular functor we use automatically takes care
of the condition on marginals.
Deﬁnition 2.1 A Harsanyi type space (over M) is a coalgebra for the functor
F in the category MeasI . A universal type space is a ﬁnal coalgebra for F in
MeasI .
The points of CX are called states of the world. A point of Xi is called an
i-type.
Our main result here is that there is a universal Harsanyi type space. Our
proof follows that of Heifetz and Samet [5]. (However, they did not formulate
type spaces as coalgebras.) In order to make the ideas more transparent, and
also because the method is much more general, we shall temporarily forget
about all of the machinery involved in the multi-player setting. Instead, we
consider functors on Meas built using ∆. We show in Section 3 below that
each such functor has a ﬁnal coalgebra.
3 Coalgebraic Modal Logic for Functors on Measurable
Spaces
3.1 Syntax and Semantics
Deﬁnition 3.1 The class of measure polynomial functors is the smallest class
of functors on Meas containing the identity, the constant functor for each
measurable space M and closed under products, coproducts, and ∆.
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For a measure polynomial functor T , we deﬁne Ing(T ), the ingredients of
T , by the following recursion: For a “constant” space M , Ing(M) = {M, Id},
Ing(Id) = {Id} Ing(U × V ) = {U × V } ∪ Ing(U) ∪ Ing(V ), and similarly for
U +V ; Ing(∆S) = {∆S}∪ Ing(S). Each T has only ﬁnitely many ingredients.
Syntax
We deﬁne just below a language L(T ). The language is sorted, and the
sorts are the ingredients of T . We write ϕ : S to mean that ϕ is a formula of
sort S; when we need it, we let FormS denote the set of such formulas.
(i) If M ∈ Ing(T ) and A is a measurable subset of M , then A : M .
(ii) true S : S.
(iii) If S ∈ Ing(T ) and ϕ, ψ : S, then also ϕ ∧ ψ : S.
(iv) If U × V ∈ Ing(T ), ϕ : U , and ψ : V , then 〈ϕ, ψ〉U×V : U × V .
(v) If U + V ∈ Ing(T ) (V + U ∈ Ing(T )) and ϕ : U , then inlU+V ϕ : U + V
(inrV +Uϕ : V + U).
(vi) If ∆S ∈ Ing(T ) and ϕ : S and p ∈ [0, 1], then βpϕ : ∆S.
(vii) If ϕ : T , then [next]ϕ : Id .
Semantics
Let c : X → TX be a coalgebra of T . The semantics assigns to each
S ∈ Ing(T ) and each ϕ : S a subset [[ϕ]]cS ⊆ SX.
[[A]]cM = A
[[true S]]
c
S = S(X)
[[ϕ ∧ ψ]]cS = [[ϕ]]cS ∩ [[ψ]]cS
[[〈ϕ, ψ〉U×V ]]cU×V = [[ϕ]]cU × [[ϕ]]cV
[[inlU+V ϕ]]cU+V = Pinl UX+V X([[ϕ]]
c
U )
[[inrU+V ϕ]]cU+V = Pinr UX+V X([[ϕ]]
c
V )
[[βpϕ]]c∆S = β
p([[ϕ]]cS)
[[[next]ϕ]]cId = c
−1([[ϕ]]cT )
The notation Pf(A) indicates throughout the paper the image under f of the
set A. We check easily that [[ϕ]]cS is always a measurable subset of SX. In the
sequel, we shall omit the superscripts on the pairing, inl , and inr operators,
since they are mostly clear from the context. We also will occasionally omit
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the superscript c and the sort subscript when dealing with the semantics of
ϕ : S on a particular coalgebra c : X → TX.
Remark 3.2 As we mentioned, if M is a measurable space, then the mea-
surable subsets of M are taken as formulas. This departs from most of the
treatments in coalgebraic modal logic, where one would take the elements of
M as formulas; these formulas are then interpreted by singletons. Our treat-
ment here makes for a more expressive language. We feel that when dealing
with a space like [0, 1], one might want to have a set denoting a subinterval
or a measurable subset of it. Also, there is a technical advantage: at various
points, it will be good to know that the set of interpretations of formulas of all
sorts coincide with the measurable subsets. To get this, one clearly must start
with the measurable subsets of the constants. The only price we pay for this
is that we require that all spaces be separative: that is, for each x ∈ M , {x} is
the intersection of all measurable A containing x. (However, this requirement
may be lifted: see Section 5.1.)
Lemma 3.3 Coalgebra morphisms preserve the semantics. That is, if f :
b → c is a morphism of coalgebras b : X → TX and c : Y → TY , and if
ϕ : S, then (Sf)−1([[ϕ]]cS) = [[ϕ]]
b
S .
3.2 The description operations and the canonical spaces
For each coalgebra c : X → TX and each x ∈ SX, we deﬁne
dcS(x) = {ϕ : S | x ∈ [[ϕ]]cS}.
In the terminology of this paper’s title, each such set dcS(x) is a satisﬁed theory.
As an easy consequence of the deﬁnition and Lemma 3.3, coalgebra mor-
phisms preserve description maps, i.e. in the conditions of the Lemma, dcS◦f =
dbS.
For each S ∈ Ing(T ), we deﬁne S∗, the canonical domain of sort S, to be
the following measurable space. In each case, the underlying set is
S∗ = {dcS(x) | for some c : X → TX, x ∈ SX}.
Note that each S∗ is a set; indeed it has cardinality at most 2cλ, where
c = 2ℵ0 is the cardinality of the continuum, and λ is the is maximum of
the cardinalities of the sets of measurable subsets of the constant functors in
Ing(T ). Usually we will use letters like s for elements of S∗. For the σ-algebra,
we ﬁrst take the subsets of S∗ of the form
|ϕ|S = {s ∈ S∗ |ϕ ∈ s}. (2)
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Then the σ-algebra on each S∗ is the one generated by this family of subsets.
(Incidentally, each S∗ is separative: s =
⋂{|ϕ|S | s ∈ |ϕ|S}.)
Lemma 3.4 For all c : X → TX, all S ∈ Ing(T ):
(i) For all ϕ : S, [[ϕ]]cS = (d
c
S)
−1(|ϕ|).
(ii) dcS : SX → S∗ is measurable.
Proof. x ∈ [[ϕ]]cS iﬀ ϕ ∈ dcS(x) iﬀ dcS(x) ∈ |ϕ|S. 
At this point, we need to have a handle on the σ-algebras on the spaces
S(Id∗). We start by deﬁning for each ϕ : S a subset ϕ̂ ⊆ S(Id ∗). The
deﬁnition is by recursion on Ing(T ) (rather than on ϕ):
For ϕ : Id , ϕ̂ = |ϕ|Id . For A : M , Â = A. For 〈ϕ, ψ〉 : U×V ,̂〈ϕ, ψ〉 = ϕ̂×ψ̂.
For ϕ : U , înlϕ = inl (ϕ̂); and ̂inrϕ = inr (ϕ̂). For ϕ : S, β̂pϕ = βpϕ̂. And for
all S, t̂rue S = S(Id
∗) and̂ϕ ∧ ψ = ϕ̂ ∩ ψ̂.
Lemma 3.5 The family of sets ϕ̂ for ϕ :: S are a set of generators of the
σ-algebra on S(Id∗), and this family is closed under ﬁnite intersections.
3.3 The maps rS : S
∗ → S(Id∗)
Lemma 3.6 There is a family of measurable maps rS : S
∗ → S(Id∗) indexed
by the ingredients of T such that the following hold:
(i) For all coalgebras c : X → TX the diagram below commutes:
SX
dcS

SdcId





S∗ rS S(Id
∗)
(3)
(ii) For all ϕ : S, r−1S (ϕ̂) = |ϕ|.
3.4 The canonical model of L(T )
At this point, we are almost ready to deﬁne the canonical model. We need a
preliminary concept ﬁrst. For each s ∈ Id ∗, let
[next]−1(s) = {ϕ : T | [next]ϕ ∈ s}. (4)
Lemma 3.7 For each s ∈ Id ∗, [next]−1(s) ∈ T ∗. Moreover, this deﬁnes a
measurable injective function [next]−1 : Id∗ → T ∗.
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Proof. Let c : X → TX and x ∈ X be such that s = dcId(x). Then c(x) ∈
TX. We claim that [next]−1(dcId(x)) = d
c
T (c(x)). For all ϕ : T ,
c(x) ∈ [[ϕ]]cT iﬀ x ∈ c−1([[ϕ]]cT ) = [[[next]ϕ]]cId .
This veriﬁes our claim. And from it, we see that [next]−1(s) indeed belongs to
T ∗.
For the measurability assertion, note that for ϕ : T , the inverse image of
|ϕ| under [next]−1 is |[next]ϕ|. (For notational reasons, we prefer not to write
out that inverse image as ([next]−1)−1(|ϕ|).)
By deﬁnition of the σ-algebra on Id ∗, this set is measurable.
We conclude by showing that [next]−1 is injective. Assume that [next]−1(s) =
[next]−1(t). Then s and t agree on all formulas of the form [next]ϕ. So they
agree on all formulas of sort Id . Thus s = t. 
We deﬁne c∗ : Id∗ → T (Id∗) to be
rT ◦ [next]−1 : Id∗ → T ∗ → T (Id∗) (5)
Note that c∗ is injective. We shall show that c∗ is a ﬁnal T -coalgebra. As our
title indicates, we build ﬁnal coalgebras from satisﬁed theories.
Lemma 3.8 (Truth Lemma) For all ϕ : S, [[ϕ]]c
∗
S = ϕ̂.
3.5 The Final Coalgebra Theorem
Lemma 3.9 dc
∗
Id = Id Id∗.
Proof. If ϕ : Id , then by the Truth Lemma, [[ϕ]]c
∗
Id = ϕ̂ = |ϕ|. So for s ∈ Id ∗,
dc
∗
Id (s) = {ϕ : Id | s ∈ [[ϕ]]c
∗
Id} = {ϕ : Id | s ∈ |ϕ|} = s.

Lemma 3.10 For each coalgebra c : X → TX, the diagrams below commute:
X
c 
dcId

TX
dcT

TdcId





Id∗
[next]−1
T ∗ rT T (Id
∗)
Hence dcId is a morphism of coalgebras.
Proof. The veriﬁcation of the square is easy, and the triangle comes from
Lemma 3.6. 
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Theorem 3.11 c∗ : Id∗ → T (Id∗) is a ﬁnal coalgebra of T .
Proof. Let c : X → TX be a T -coalgebra. By Lemma 3.10, dcId is a coalgebra
morphism. For the uniqueness, suppose that f is any morphism. Since f
preserves descriptions, dc
∗
Id ◦ f = dcId . But by Lemma 3.9, dc∗Id = Id Id∗ . So
f = dc
∗
Id ◦ f = dcId , just as desired. 
We conclude with an important corollary of our development. We know of
no direct proof of Corollary 3.12 below.
Corollary 3.12 For each S ∈ Ing(T ), the map rS : S∗ → S(Id∗) is surjective.
Proof. Consider the coalgebra c∗ : Id∗ → T (Id∗). By Lemma 3.6, rS ◦ dc∗S =
Sdc
∗
Id . And by Lemma 3.9, d
c∗
Id = Id Id∗ . Thus rS ◦dc∗S = SId Id∗ = IdS(Id∗). And
this means that rS is surjective. 
4 The Universal Harsanyi Type Space
In this section, we show how to adapt our work to the case of Harsanyi type
spaces considered as coalgebras on MeasI . To make the notation more manage-
able, we assume that I = {1, 2, 3}. Let M be a ﬁxed separative measurable
space. Let Pr 1, Pr 2, and Pr 3 be the obvious projections Pr i : Meas
I →
Meas. Let U1, U2, and U3 be the functors Ui : Meas
I → Meas given as fol-
lows: U1(X1, X2, X3) = M × Pr2 × Pr 3, U2(X1, X2, X3) = M × Pr 1 × Pr 3,
U3(X1, X2, X3) = M × Pr 1 × Pr 2. Let Ti = ∆Ui. So we are interested in the
functor F : MeasI → MeasI given by (T1, T2, T3).
We write Ing(F) for {M,Ui, Ti,Pr i | i = 1, 2, 3}. Notice that as deﬁned
here, all the ingredients of F are functors from MeasI to Meas.
We formulate our language L to have formulas of sort S for S ∈ Ing(F).
L is deﬁned as follows: true Pr i : Pr i. If A is a measurable subset of M , then
A : M . If ϕ0 : M , ϕ2 : Pr 2, ϕ3 : Pr 3, then 〈ϕ0, ϕ2, ϕ3〉 : U1. We have similar
clauses for U2 and U3. We also have clauses for the ∆ functors: if ϕ : Ui, then
βpϕ : Ti. If ϕ : Ti, then [nexti]ϕ : Pr i. (This is not really needed for the M
sorts.)
Let X = (X1, X2, X3), and let c : X → FX be a coalgebra of F. The
semantics assigns to each S ∈ Ing(F) and each ϕ : S a subset [[ϕ]]cS ⊆ SX.
Here are some representative cases. [[true Pr i]] = Xi. [[[nexti]ϕ]]
c
Pri
= c−1i ([[ϕ]]
c
Ti
),
where c = (c1, c2, c3), or in other words, ci = Pri(c). Suppose that ϕ0 :
M,ϕ2 : Pr 2 and ϕ3 : Pr3, then 〈ϕ0, ϕ2, ϕ3〉 : U1. We set [[〈ϕ0, ϕ2, ϕ3〉]]cU1 =
[[ϕ0]]
c
M×[[ϕ2]]cPr2×[[ϕ3]]cPr3 . Finally, suppose that ϕ : U3 so that βpϕ : T3. Given
[[ϕ]]cU3 ⊆ U3(X), we set [[βpϕ]]cT3 = βp([[ϕ]]cU3) ⊆ T3(X).
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For a F-coalgebra X, and S ∈ Ing(F), we deﬁne dcS so that dcS(x) = {ϕ :
S | x ∈ [[ϕ]]cS}. We also deﬁne |ϕ|S and S∗ just as before, using the sets |ϕ|S as
the generators of the σ-algebra on S∗. Each dcS is again measurable.
Much of the remaining constructions are similar to what we have already
seen. The role of Id ∗ is played by (Pr ∗1,Pr
∗
2,Pr
∗
3). This turns out to be the car-
rier of the ﬁnal coalgebra for F. We deﬁne dc(Pr1,Pr2,Pr3) : X → (Pr ∗1,Pr ∗2,Pr ∗3)
as (dcPr1 , d
c
Pr2
, dcPr3).
Lemma 4.1 There is a family of measurable maps rS : S
∗ → S(Pr ∗1,Pr ∗2,Pr ∗3)
indexed by Ing(F) such that the following hold:
a. For all coalgebras c : X → FX, rS ◦ dcS = Sdc(Pr1,Pr2,Pr3).
b. rS is injective.
c. The σ-algebra on S(Pr ∗1,Pr
∗
2,Pr
∗
3) is generated by the sets ϕ for ϕ : S.
The proof follows closely the work outlined in Lemma 3.6.
Now we have for each i ∈ I a function [nexti]−1 : Pr ∗i → T ∗i and c∗i =
rTi ◦ [nexti]−1. The statement corresponding to that of Lemma 3.9 is that
dc
∗
Pr i
= IdPr∗i , so d
c∗
(Pr1,Pr2,Pr3)
= Id (Pr1,Pr2,Pr3).
Theorem 4.2 c∗ : (Pr ∗1, P r
∗
2,Pr
∗
3) → F(Pr ∗1, P r∗2,Pr ∗3) is a ﬁnal coalgebra of
F.
The proofs are the same, mutatis mutandis.
As the reader has probably guessed, the work here can be generalized to
polynomials on MeasI . These are I-indexed family of functors Ti : Meas
I →
Meas built from the projections, constants for separative spaces, products
and sums, and ∆. The work in this section generalizes to show that each
polynomial on MeasI has a ﬁnal coalgebra. The details are not much more
than what we have seen.
5 Further Variations and Extensions of the Basic Con-
struction
We have already seen the main construction of ﬁnal coalgebras for the poly-
nomials on Meas built from separative spaces. We also saw (by example) how
to generalize this to systems, thereby building the universal Harsanyi type
spaces. The rest of the paper oﬀers variations and extensions of the basic
technique.
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5.1 Extension: Non-separative Spaces
The main point of working with separative spaces is that the points of such a
space may be recovered from the σ-algebra (as the set of all singleton intersec-
tions) and from the satisﬁed theories in our language. This allowed us to have
a language for the measurable subsets of various spaces. In the absence of sep-
arativity, we need to do a little more work. We need to add the singleton sets
{m} to the formulas of sort M . Now the semantics of some sentences might
not be measurable. So to compensate, we insist that in formulas of the form
βpϕ, all of the subterms of constant sort are measurable. This side condition
makes the semantics well-deﬁned. The rest of the argument is essentially the
same as what we have seen.
5.2 Variation: Kripke Polynomial Functors on Set
In this section, we check that the same method gives representations for ﬁ-
nal coalgebras for functors on Set built from the identity functor, the ﬁnite
power set functor, product and coproduct, ﬁxed (ﬁnite or inﬁnite) sets, and
functions from a ﬁxed set. Following Ro¨ßiger and Jacobs, we call these Kripke
polynomial functors (KPF’s) on Set.
The function space construct means that if S is a KPF and E is a set,
then SE is a KPF. As a functor, it is given by SE(a) = (S(a))E; this is the
set of functions α : E → Sa. And if f : a → b so that Sf : Sa → Sb, then
SEf is given by SEf(α) = (Sf) ◦ α.
We also take Ing(SE) = {SE} ∪ Ing(S).
To avoid double subscripts or confusion with our notation P for the power
set functor, we shall use Q for the ﬁnite power set functor on Set. Being a
functor, we shall apply Q to functions as well as sets, writing, e.g., Qr(X) for
the image r[X] of the ﬁnite set X under r.
It is well-known in the coalgebra literature that the ﬁnite Kripke polyno-
mial functors all have ﬁnal coalgebras. One can prove this by checking that
all such functors are bounded and then using the much more general fact that
bounded functors on Set have ﬁnal coalgebras. Alternatively, one can use a
logical approach, as done in papers such as [7,9,11,13]. This is the approach
that we take. However, our work is a bit diﬀerent than in the cited works since
our ﬁnal coalgebra is based on the satisﬁed theories rather than the maximal
consistent ones in some logical system. This means that our result is actually
weaker, since we do not obtain a completeness result. On the other hand, we
believe that it is is easier to get the ﬁnal coalgebra this way. And the general
method works even in the absence of a logic, as we have seen in the work on
measurable spaces.
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Our syntax is constructed so that if for some set A, the associated constant
functor A ∈ Ing(T ), then each element a ∈ A is a formula of sort A. Further,
if QS ∈ Ing(T ) and ϕ : S, then ϕ : QS, and if SE ∈ Ing(T ) for some set E,
ϕ : S and e ∈ E, then (e)ϕ : SE. Finally, we enrich our syntax to allow for
boolean negation and conjunction in all sorts.
In our semantics, we deﬁne [[a]]cA = {a}, and also
[[ϕ]]cQS = Q([[ϕ]]
c
S). (6)
As usual, we also use the notation ϕ for the dual of ϕ. So
[[ϕ]]cQS = {w ∈ QSX |w ∩ [[ϕ]]cS = ∅}.
The semantics of the (e)ϕ construct is
[[(e)ϕ]]cSE = {f ∈ S(X)E | f(e) ∈ [[ϕ]]cS}. (7)
The semantics of the boolean connectives are classical.
Most of the rest of the results from earlier in the paper go through with
only minor changes, dropping the word “measurable” and anything having to
do with the measurable space structure. The only diﬀerences are in Lemma 3.6
and the Truth Lemma 3.8. Before we turn to the analogs of those results, we
need a general result.
Lemma 5.1 Let C be any category, let (Xi)i∈I be a family of C-objects, as-
sume that X =
∑
Xi is their coproduct with ini : Xi → X as the coproduct
maps. Let T : C → C be a functor, and let (ci)i∈I be a family of T -coalgebra
maps, so ci : Xi → TXi. Then there is a map c : X → TX so that for all i,
ini is a T -coalgebra morphism ini : ci → c.
Proof. For each i ∈ I, T ini ◦ ci : Xi → TX. By the universal property of the
coproduct, there is some c : X → TX so that for all i, T ini ◦ ci = c ◦ ini . So c
is a coalgebra structure map. And as desired, ini is a T -coalgebra morphism.
The main diﬀerence between our work in this section and the earlier work
in Section 3 is that this time we prove that the functions rS are surjective
before we can prove the Truth Lemma. (Recall that in the measurable space
setting we derived the surjectivity of rS in Corollary 3.12.)
Lemma 5.2 There is a family of bijective maps rS : S
∗ → S(Id∗) indexed by
the ingredients of T such that for all coalgebras c : X → TX, rS ◦ dcS = SdcId .
The argument for Lemma 5.2 is rather close to what we ﬁnd in classical
work in modal logic.
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The same work as in Section 3.5 gives the desired ﬁnal coalgebra theorem.
Theorem 5.3 For each Kripke polynomial functor T , c∗ : Id∗ → T (Id∗) is a
ﬁnal coalgebra.
5.3 Other spaces
We are conﬁdent that the technique here extends to other kinds of concrete
categories, such as compact Hausdorﬀ spaces and the Borel probability mea-
sure with the weak ∗-topology. This case had been studied in relation to type
spaces beginning with [2]. Indeed, we hope to expand the technique as much
as possible in the coming months.
5.4 Conclusion and future directions
This paper has had two overall points. First, we connect work in the eco-
nomics/game theory area with coalgebras. We feel that most, if not all, of the
constructions of universal type spaces and related objects may be obtained by
our method. We intend that the ﬁnal version of our paper will show this. The
more common method in the area is to construct an ωop-limit and then follow
this by a subspace construction. Though we did not discuss the matter here,
we feel that the our method is somewhat simpler. As we have indicated, it
generalizes easily to other settings. We also already generalized known results
from particular functors to polynomials. Since the theories here are connected
to logic, it should be possible to formulate logical systems for all the functors
involved and prove completeness theorems. But this we leave to future work.
The construction of using satisﬁed theories to obtain ﬁnal coalgebras is
quite old in the area of coalgebra and its predecessors. For coalgebras per
se, one can ﬁnd it in Rutten [14]. The technique is perhaps implicit in Kurz,
Kupke, and Venema [8]; this paper also contains a note that Jacobs’ ﬁnal
coalgebra result in [7] for Kripke polynomials on Set contains an error. Our
result does not use maximal consistent sets in a logical system but rather the
satisﬁed theories. This is simpler, though of course one must do more work
to get completeness results. From the side of coalgebra, perhaps what is most
original here is taking a language for sets as opposed to (or, in addition to) a
language of points. The interplay of the two languages is well worth studying.
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